

Command Training Program and exchange crews/teams for collective training events (emphasis added)."

Implementation. Near-term (within 2 to 3 months) implementation would entail:

- Identifying AC or enhanced-brigade light infantry units and ARNG mechanized units to test various concepts.

- Using IDT for train-up and concept testing during LANES designed by the training support brigade (TSB) for annual training. The training would include operations at an aerial port of embarkation (APOE) and aerial port of debarkation (APOD), deployment and METL development.

- Identifying available vehicles such as PANDUR, LAV, M113 or others.

In the midterm (within 4 to 6 months), implementation would entail:

- Conducting IDT LANES in pure forms for each element and becoming familiar with the other.

- Conducting IDT and AT teaming and training with LANES evaluation by the TSB as the culminating event and, if feasible, load out platoon-size elements using forward logistic sites (FLS).

In the long term (within 7 to 12 months), implementation would entail:

- Identifying units for conversion to mobile assault units and activating additional units as needed.

- Forming light infantry or ground-lift teams to begin habitual relationships.

The end state, then, is to:

- Add value to the force with minimal expense by leveraging component strengths.

- Provide strategic capability for force planners.

- Validate teaming and the total-force concept.

Incentives. With the decreased funding per battalion, when considered against the present cost of maintaining mechanized units, proficiency pay can be considered for the approximately 260 soldiers in the unit. Special badges or tabs could also be a symbol of unit pride.

Resource Implications

Resource implications include the cost per RC soldier, which is approximately one-third the cost of the AC counterpart. Increased force protection, mobility, deployability and lethality for AC and RC soldiers are worth the effort.

According to FORSCOM Regulation 350-4, "The primary impetus for Army teaming is to maximize contributions of the ARNG and USAR in execution of National Military Strat-

egy and to replicate the cohesiveness of AC/RC unit relationships that existed with Cold War-era CAPSTONE alignments, but updated to reflect the demands and missions of a capabilities-based force. The goal is to strengthen the Army's ability to respond across the full spectrum of military operations—from state/domestic to multinational/worldwide requirements."

Active Component and ARNG units newly nominated to convert to the medium concept will encounter the same familiar obstacles of manning, equipping, funding and training. A more focused and limited approach would help the ARNG quickly become a "player." This is its opportunity to think about getting into the box to provide an asset that is needed, deployable and affordable. ☛

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The 75th Ranger Regiment: A Tactical Force With Strategic Implications

Colonel P.K. Keen, US Army, and Major Dominic J. Caraccilo, US Army

The erosion of the bipolar spheres of interest between the former Communist Block and Western nations and the resulting power vacuum continue to foster regional instability that has strategic ramifications. This instability is compounded by the globalization and interdependence of:

- Regional interests.
- Regional arms races.
- Rising economic and social expectations.
- Pan-nationalism.
- Re-emergence of ethnic and

tribal conflicts.

- Population growth.
- Urbanization.
- Global competition for limited resources.
- Pandemic and environmental disasters.
- Disparity in wealth.
- Rapid social and technological change.

Today's security environment is dynamic, uncertain and challenging. Global concerns include ethnic conflict and outlaw states that threaten regional stability; terrorism; orga-

nized crime syndicates; environmental damage; and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).¹

The projected future strategic environment will have fewer wars but more conflict.² The synergistic effect of such conditions creates opportunities for state and nonstate actors to disrupt US pursuit of its goals and objectives.

Existing threat environments hold sobering implications for US forces. By 2010 more than 70 percent of the world's population will be living in

urban areas. Military operations in Panama, Somalia and Chechnya demonstrate the sociological, political and tactical factors of urban conflict.

- The presence of noncombatants significantly affects planning, tactics, rules of engagement (ROE) and political-military strategy.

- Balancing ROE is difficult, especially in high-intensity cases. Constructing and managing flexible ROE so they are neither restrictive nor permissive is critical. Improper ROE results in excessive death and collateral damage.

- During military operations in urban terrain, media and information operations exploit damages caused by opposing forces for their own interests.³

While threats facing the United States are a strategic menace, defeating them requires more than just a force that understands strategic implications; it requires a force that has mastered small-unit tactics.

A military force that can withstand various asymmetric threats must be robust and flexible and be able to plan confidentially in a strategic environment and execute proficiently in any tactical adversity. Even slight tactical lapses against asymmetric threats can spell strategic defeat.

The Force of Choice

The 75th Ranger Regiment is uniquely chartered to conduct tactical-, operational- and strategic-level operations, and unlike conventional infantry units, it directly supports strategic objectives. The Ranger force habitually trains for and will operate under restrictive ROE. Such power, restraint and flexibility are useful. Since the first Ranger battalion was formed in 1974, the Ranger force has participated in every US military operation.

Recognizing the need for a highly-trained, highly-mobile reaction force, the US Army Chief of Staff General Creighton W. Abrams Jr., directed activation of the first battalion-size Ranger units since World War II. Abrams wanted the battalion to be an elite force that could master tactical skills for use in a strategic framework at times when nothing

but the best would do.

Grenada. The wisdom of Abrams' foresight was proven during the 25 October 1983 US deployment to Grenada, where Rangers helped protect US citizens and restore democracy. During Operation *Urgent Fury*, the 1st and 2d Ranger Battalions conducted a daring low-level parachute assault, seized the airfield at Point Salines, rescued US citizens at the True Blue Medical Campus and conducted air assault operations to eliminate pockets of resistance. The strategic deployment and tactical operations proved to be a baptism by fire for the modern-day Rangers.

As a result of the 75th Regiment's demonstrated effectiveness, in 1984 the Department of the Army decided to increase the size of the Active Duty Ranger force by activating an additional Ranger battalion and a Ranger regimental headquarters. The new units—the 3d Battalion (Ranger), 75th Infantry; and Headquarters and Headquarters Company (Ranger), 75th Infantry—received their colors on 3 October 1984 at Fort Benning, Georgia.

Panama. In 1989 the 75th Ranger Regiment participated in Operation *Just Cause* to help restore democracy to Panama. Rangers spearheaded two important operations. The 1st Battalion, reinforced by C Company, 3d Battalion, and a regimental command and control (C²) team conducted an early morning parachute assault to seize Omar Torrijos International Airport and Tocumen Military Airfield. The forces neutralized the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) 2d Rifle Company and secured airfields for the 82d Airborne Division's arrival. The 2d Ranger Battalion, with the other 3d Ranger companies, and another regimental C² team conducted a parachute assault onto the airfield at Rio Hato to neutralize the PDF's 6th and 7th Rifle Companies and seize Panamanian General Manuel Noriega's beach house.

Following the assaults, the Rangers conducted follow-on special operations to support Joint Task Force (JTF) SOUTH. The Rangers captured 1,014 enemy prisoners of war and more than 18,000 arms, sustaining only 47 casualties, five of whom

were killed in action.

Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Haiti. In 1991, 1st Ranger Battalion elements deployed to Saudi Arabia during Operation *Desert Storm*. In 1993, 3d Ranger Battalion elements supported the United Nations operation in Somalia, where on 3–4 October the Ranger Force fought valiantly for 18 hours. In 1994 a large Ranger force was postured to invade Haiti, only to stand down when peace negotiations succeeded.

Required Characteristics

The 75th Ranger Regiment is functionally structured so it can respond to a resourcing headquarters in the US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). Also, it can be organized to fight as part of a war-fighting headquarters, which is habitually associated with a joint special operations task force (JSOTF) established by either the theater commanders in chief (CINCs) or the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The Regiment has evolved because of such unique relationships and because of continuing threats from sophisticated and capable modern armies and nonstate paramilitary actors such as terrorists, clan warlords, organized-crime syndicates and drug cartels.

Given the current technology proliferation, these threat entities will likely possess modern arms, night-vision devices, sensors (or access to commercial systems), secure communications and information-warfare capability. Undisciplined threat players, not constrained by the rules of war or predictable doctrine, will increase conflict complexity.

The likely acquisition of WMD by rogue states and nonstate actors, coupled with increased technical sophistication, expose Ranger forces to greater risk and increase the consequences of mission failure. To counter such risks, the 75th Regiment has evolved from a 1970s-based, small-unit, combat-patrolling element into a complex direct-action force.

Inherent in this evolution is the breakdown of traditional organizational associations. Changes in all organizations, most notably in the military, occur along four distinct lines: operational focus, the threat,

technology and force structure.

Operational focus. Keeping pace with changing environments is a challenge. As a global reaction force, the 75th Regiment is linked to regional CINCs. The Regiment now ties training to contingency plans (CONPLANS) in each area of operation (AOR) in contrast with a training strategy that aligns geographically dispersed battalions with desert, arctic and other training environments.

The Ranger force's two-pronged approach ensures it is prepared to fight as part of a JSOTF in each AOR. By focusing its engagement strategy on AORs, the Regiment benefits strategically and tactically. The strategic benefit is integration with the combat headquarters. The tactical benefit is gained by coexisting in the assigned AOR.

To support the focus on the AORs, Rangers first tie field training and staff exercises to regional CONPLANS. Second, Special Operations Command assigns liaisons as an integral section of each headquarters. A recent initiative placed a Ranger-experienced officer at all joint headquarters to promote better understanding of Ranger capabilities in that AOR. Such initiatives—placed in the context of rapid political, economic, social, cultural and technological change—help CINCs circumvent uncertainty, intensity and lethality.

The Threat. As the Ranger force shifts from a rural, environment-driven training approach to a sophisticated training strategy based on CONPLANS at the JCS level, its missions have changed. Most AORs require a capability for high-risk, politically sensitive urban operations. Therefore, the Ranger force has focused extensively on urban-warfare training.

Because many future combat operations could occur in urban environments rife with hand-held grenade launchers, the Ranger force has an extensive ground-mobility training program. The program trains soldiers on the use of light vehicles, such as motorcycles and all terrain

vehicles; medium vehicles, such as Ranger special operations vehicles (RSOV); and heavy vehicles, such as armored ground mobility systems.

The Ranger force has a clear set of future mission profiles (airfield seizures and air assault in support of potential urban operations or non-combatant evacuation operations), augmented by the hardware it needs for support. The future force will be able to maintain a high level of proficiency against the full array of AOR environmental challenges.

Technology. The 75th Regiment leads the Army in technological change. Combat developers and US Army Training and Doctrine Command soldier-support components habitually use Ranger units for testing and user input. Because of the regiment's ties to JCS CONPLANS and its readiness to deploy one company within 9 hours and an entire battalion within 18 hours, it has first-unit-equipped status for all new systems. As a result, the Ranger force is no longer an austere infantry element; it is a sophisticated, technologically integrated force.

Ranger operations require sharing information with dispersed battalions. Ranger warfighting headquarters are usually distant from Ranger planning headquarters. To mitigate information-sharing difficulties, the Ranger force operates the tactical web (TACWEB), a local area network (LAN). The LAN's linked files are smartly organized to a front page resembling the military decision-making process. The entire system allows real-time information sharing, promotes parallel planning and ensures that higher headquarters and subordinate units' plans nest.

Force structure. The Ranger force was initially charted as two separate but tactically and strategically linked battalions. In 1984, the regiment was formed and added the third battalion. The Ranger force has since matured as a special operations element and as an infantry unit. A series of concept improvements has been implemented, including forming a Ranger reconnaissance detachment (RRD) that can operate

with other special operations elements as a special reconnaissance force for the JTF and the Ranger force. RRDs support special operations direct-action missions by directing and controlling fire support and providing real-time digital imagery from the target area.

The 75th Regiment has an organic Ranger signal detachment (RSD) and a military intelligence detachment (MID). The RSD:

- Provides secure communications and Internet access.
- Conducts organizational direct support- and general support-level repairs of radio, cryptological and computer equipment.
- Maintains an automated data processing section that has a robust capability.
- Establishes and maintains the regimental TACWEB.

The MID provides all-source intelligence analysis to the Regiment and subordinate battalions and a full menu of intelligence products and activities, including:

- Imagery analysis.
- Joint and national imagery products.
- Terrain models for plans and operations.
- Topographic analysis.
- Counterintelligence.
- A tactical sensitive compartmentalized information facility.
- Connectivity to national and joint intelligence agencies.
- Use of individual hand-held video equipment.
- Nonstandard imagery products from various sources.
- Target packets for all Ranger operations.

Because of its stringent entry requirements, the 75th Regiment provides its own training detachment to assess and train all new Rangers and screen and assess those attending the US Army Ranger School.

The Ranger force has developed various force-structure concepts now prevalent in the Army. The mortar platoon "arms-room concept" consolidates organic 120-millimeter (mm), 81-mm and 60-mm weapons. This structure allows indirect-fire

assets to be tailored as the mission commander requires, provides a united focus for training and instills unity of command.

An additional initiative provides medical training for all Rangers, who invariably will operate in short, violent, high-risk activities. The Regiment also requires a higher standard of medical training for health services personnel. All medic positions are filled by noncommissioned officers who have received advanced training at the Special Operations Medical Course (SOMC), which produces emergency medical technicians and paramedics. Each rifle company has five SOMC medics.

Ranger medics also train in trauma centers and periodically ride with ambulances. To ensure that all casualties are treated, the commander requires all Rangers to be proficient as combat lifesavers.

Strategic Roots

What makes the Ranger force so different from other infantry units is its link with National Military Strategy (NMS). The force is a major player in USSOCOM and USASOC's strategic planning guidance, which focuses Army special operations forces (SOF) on supporting national military objectives and the five regional CINCs. NMS prescribes four broad strategic concepts that govern the application of military power to achieve national military objectives: strategic agility, overseas presence, power projection and decisive force.⁴

Strategic agility. Strategic agility provides timely employment, concentration and sustainment of forces anywhere in the world at the United States' initiative and at a speed and tempo adversaries cannot match. The Ranger force, continuously on an 18-hour readiness posture, gives a CINC strategic agility.⁵

Overseas presence. Overseas presence allows a visible posture of US forces and their infrastructure strategically positioned in and near key regions. While the 75th Regiment might have no forces prominently stationed in an AOR, its regional engagement strategy gives it a ubiquitous characteristic much like that of SOF elements in a CINC's AOR. The combination of continu-

ous training overseas tied with the presence of Ranger liaisons weighs heavily on the force's ability to maintain a strategic capability along with the NMS.

Power projection. Power projection is the ability to rapidly, effectively deploy and sustain US military power in and from multiple, dispersed locations until conflict resolution. The nation's reliance on the Ranger force to deploy a company in 9 hours, a battalion in 18 hours and the entire regiment in 72 hours validates its power-projection abilities.

Decisive force. Decisive force is the commitment of sufficient military power to overwhelm an adversary, establish new military conditions and achieve a political resolution favorable to US interests. The Ranger regiment is the largest direct-action force in USSOCOM.

Tactical Proficiency

Soldiers who become US Army Rangers volunteer three times past their enlistment so they can attend Airborne School, the Ranger Indocination Program and Ranger School. Soldiers' motivation and the training they receive give the Ranger force a high baseline from which to establish its tactical edge. The common theme in all training is the development and nourishment of the warrior spirit. Technically and tactically proficient Rangers are emotionally and intellectually prepared to be the decisive force.

To maintain the Army's technical and tactical edge, the 75th Regiment has priority for receiving new equipment. Ranger units receive portable weapons; lightweight clothing and equipment; improved rations, the latest communications equipment; and surveillance, target acquisition and night-observation devices as soon as such items are ready for use. While modernization is key to the combat edge, the focus is on "equipping the man" not "manning the equipment."

Training

Rangers master tactical skills during an extraordinary program, training continuously except for 2-week periods of block leave twice a year. Training ensures that each battalion

is prepared for no-notice deployment. The high number of soldiers available for training, with few external distractions and numerous off-post exercises, ensures combat readiness.

The Regiment's regional engagement plan ensures that soldiers receive cold weather, jungle, desert and mountain training. Elements, peers and evaluators test Ranger leaders, who receive comprehensive feedback for each training exercise. Emergency deployment-readiness exercises (EDRE), conducted at least once during each Readiness Force 1 (RF1) cycle, and joint readiness training exercises complete the array of Ranger training.

All Ranger training is performance-oriented to achieve realism and a sense of accomplishment. The Regiment focuses on the basics of physical conditioning, marksmanship, small-unit drills and medical training, conducting only training guaranteed to improve individual or collective skills. Multiechelon training ties the basics to leader training.


No ingredient plays a more important role in honing and developing battlefield skills than does stress conditioning. Army Research Institute studies show that soldiers who have not trained under stressful conditions do not react well when confronted with antagonistic situations, tending to compromise critical or sensitive situations. Training under stress helps soldiers more easily overcome such situations. Highly motivated soldiers training under exacting and stressful conditions reach higher levels of performance and retain skills longer.

To train under stress and instill the warrior ethos in all Rangers, the Regiment integrates various training events. The EDRE program is a deliberately planned, no-notice exercise for an RF1 battalion. The staff immediately launches into an 18-hour crisis-action planning process, and the exercise stresses the entire battalion.

Other training events that emulate battle stress include a program for Ranger captains' professional development—the Mangoday Program, which reinforces the warrior spirit. The program, named for 13th-

century Mongolian commander Genghis Kahn's elite shock troops, focuses on critical individual and collective tasks and requires company-grade officers to perform the tasks of radio-teletype operators, machine gunners, mortar men and antitank gunners. Officers learn flexibility as they react to unexpected situations or faulty intelligence, building teams, morale and esprit by accomplishing difficult tasks together. All captains attend at least one of two annual sessions.

Complementing stress conditioning during daily training is the stress of the battalions' intensified readiness as the Ranger Readiness Force. The three Ranger battalions alternate duty as RF1 so that one battalion is always poised for emergencies.

When a battalion is on a ready-force assignment, its troops and equipment can be assembled, loaded and ready for deployment within 18 hours. Any no-notice alert, which might appear to be a readiness-training exercise, could actually be a call to combat. The experience, training, equipment, exercises and warrior spirit in the Ranger Regiment maintain a tactically superior, strategically significant force. 

NOTES

1. The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office (GPO), May 1997), 1.
2. US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), "Strategic Planning Guidance: SOF in the 21st Century" (January 1999), 8-3.
3. Sean J.A. Edwards, *Mars Unmasked: The Changing Face of Urban Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000), 95.
4. USASOC, 9.
5. The 75th Ranger Regiment is chartered to have available a battalion-size force with associated equipment at 100 percent strength at any given time. The Regiment is required to provide a Ranger company capable of deploying to anywhere in the world in 9 hours or less.

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Digest

21st Century Copyright Law

Alice King

Copyright law can be traced back to the first English copyright law, the 1710 *Statute of Anne*, by which royalty attempted to control anti-Crown book publishers. Modern US copyright law is based on the *US Constitution*, codified in Title 17 of the US Code and interpreted by various courts.

US copyright laws recognize a balance between the rights of a copyright holder and society's need to use copyrighted works to further education and learning. That is, copyright law gives proprietary rights to copyright owners while granting learning rights to users through fair-use mandates.

Copyright applies to the expression of an author's idea—not the idea itself. It also does not cover facts. Titles, names, short phrases, blank forms, basic calendar formats, measuring devices and other common things are not subject to copyright.

1976 Copyright Act

The 1976 *Copyright Act* brought nearly all copyrights under federal law, the exception being the right of state governments to copyright their own publications. Once a work becomes 75 years old, it falls into the public domain and can be used freely by anyone for anything.

Copyright is automatically provided to authors of original works created since 1976. Anything that is fixed in a tangible medium can be copyrighted. A tangible medium is one that can be perceived by someone else. The medium itself is not important. An original work can be in almost any format, from printed items such as books and periodicals to databases and digital video disks and as diverse as a fabric design or the latest toy.

Before 1976, if a work had not been published, it was protected by state common law. In effect, it was protected forever. This included un-

published manuscripts, letters, journals, diaries and other works usually found in university libraries, state historical societies and archives.

1998 Copyright Term Extension Act

In October 1998, the *Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act* (SBCTEA) became law. All copyrights were extended for 20 years. Works already 75 years old were allowed to fall into the public domain. Works published after 31 December 1922 will go into the public domain after 95 years.

The extension retains a limited exemption for libraries, archives and nonprofit educational institutions. These entities can use works that are in their last 20 years of copyright status as if they were in the public domain. The exemption provides an exception as long as a work is not subject to normal exploitation, cannot be obtained at a reasonable price, or